Law of The Sea
What is Law of The Sea?
History/ Background of Law of The Sea.
Development of Law of The Sea.
Importance of Law of The Sea.
Concern about the impact of new technologies upon the oceans, militarization and expanding state claims to ownership of parts of the oceans, e.g., continental shelf and exclusive economic zones, together with growing economic disparity and associated harm to long-term human security, prompted Arvid Pardo to develop the idea that all ocean space, i.e., surface of the sea, water column, seabed and its subsoil, and living resources, should be declared the CHM, irrespective of existing claims to national jurisdiction.
The intention was to replace the outdated legal concept of “freedom of the high seas” by proclaiming ocean areas an international commons. (Areas with significant natural resources that are acknowledged to be beyond the limits of the national jurisdiction of sovereign states are known as international commons.) Freedom of the high seas, developed by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), creates an open access regime allowing for its laissez-faire use. The few restrictions that exist serve only to protect the interests of other states and their exercise of free use.
In contrast, as the CHM, ocean space and its resources would be a commons that could not be owned by states beyond a certain limit. As a commons it would be open to the international community of states, but its use would be subject to international administration and management for the common good of all humanity. Where areas of ocean space and resources existed within national jurisdiction, states would regulate and manage use on behalf of all mankind, not solely for the benefit of national interests.
This approach recognized the unity of the oceans as ecological systems and rejected both laissez-faire freedom and unfettered state sovereignty. It included efforts to simplify ocean jurisdiction by establishing one single line of demarcation between national and international ocean space (Draft Ocean Space Treaty of 1971) and prevent gradually expanding claims to national jurisdiction.
The CHM was originally intended as a concept that would revolutionize the law of the sea by applying to all ocean space and resources. But in 1967 Arvid Pardo recognized that this would be rejected by the powerful states who were attempting to extend their sovereign claims to more ocean space and resources. By focusing on the legal status of the much more limited entity of the “seabed” beyond national jurisdiction, it was thought that CHM could gain an important foothold within the U.N. system.
The 1967 Maltese proposal lead to a number of important developments, including the 1970 U.N. General Assembly Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. This declaration set out the legal principles needed to implement the notion that the seabed and its resources are the CHM, and it helped create consensus for the negotiation of a new law of the sea convention: UNCLOS III (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea). The ultimate outcome was a much more limited application of CHM than ever intended by its advocates. As will be explained immediately below, UNCLOS III restricted the application of CHM to a few rocks, e.g., mineral resources such as manganese nodules, sitting on the bottom of the deep seabed.
Part XI of UNCLOS III deals with the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof (the “Area”) beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Article 136 declares the Area and its resources (only) to be the “common heritage of mankind.” The Area and its resources cannot be claimed, appropriated, or owned by any state or person (Article 137). All rights to resources belong to mankind as a whole, with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) acting on mankind’s behalf (Article 140). The ISA must ensure the equitable sharing of financial and other benefits arising from activities in the Area, taking into particular account the needs and interests of developing states and others. Promotion of research, transfer of technology to developing states and protection of the marine environment’s ecological balance are all important functions of the ISA (Articles 143–145).
Part XI provisions create an international administration and management regime for only a small part of the international commons (the Area and its resources). It does not generally replace the freedom of the high seas (Part VII); thus the intended revolution of the law of the sea was not achieved. In the 1970s, the most commercially viable mineral resources of the Area were thought to be manganese nodules, hence Pardo’s view that CHM was reduced in its application to “ugly little rocks lying in the darkest depths of all creation.” Despite this serious limitation, the use of CHM was revolutionary enough to be one of the reasons why the US refused to adhere to UNCLOS III.
To date, commercial use of the Area and its resources has not occurred. Further, the traditional fragmented approach to jurisdiction over separate elements of ocean space and resources endures despite the irrefutable unity of ecological systems.
The international law of the sea comprises all the legal norms pertaining to the sea and applicable to relations between states. It contains rules on the delimitation and exploitation of maritime areas as well as provisions on the protection and exploration of the oceans. However, some fields fall outside its scope; these include matters covered by national legislation, such as regulations on port and harbour operations, and maritime law, which in Germany is mainly enshrined in the Commercial Code and regulates activities such as the transportation of goods.
For thousands of years, the sea was simply a source of food and was only of interest to people to that extent. With the rise of the great seafaring nations such as the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain from the 15th century onwards, however, these kingdoms increasingly sought to expand their spheres of influence. Access to mineral resources and other new commodities aroused ambitions and triggered a race to conquer the oceans, faraway islands and coastlines and thus achieve dominance in the world. This led to numerous wars and sea battles. Early on, scholars sought answers to one important question: who does the sea actually belong to? It is a question which the international law of the sea has been unable to resolve satisfactorily to this day. From the outset, the quest for an answer was dominated by the tension between the concept of the freedom of the seas, or mare liberum (the free sea), formulated by the Dutch philosopher and jurist Hugo Grotius (1583 to 1645), and the concept of mare clausum (closed sea) developed by the English scholar and polymath John Selden (1584 to 1654). The pivotal issue was – and is – whether the sea is international territory and all nations are free to use it, or whether it can be claimed by individual states. Neither of these two positions has ultimately prevailed, and the conflict between the positions is still apparent in the present structure of the international law of the sea. Currently, the primary instrument of governance for the seas is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982 as the outcome of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Various norms of customary international law supplement UNCLOS. The Convention is the most comprehensive international treaty ever concluded. It is based on the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1958: these are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. These treaties codified the – unwritten – custom- ary law which had previously applied. For example, since the mid-17th century, countries had generally accepted that national rights applied to a specified belt of water, known as the territorial sea, extending from a nation’s coastlines, usually for three nautical miles – roughly equivalent to the distance travelled by a cannon shot.
From the mid-20th century, the seas became an increasing focus of interest as a source of natural resources such as oil and gas. Many coastal states therefore attempted to extend their national jurisdiction over ever-larger areas of the sea and the seabed. Some laid claim to a 200 nautical mile zone. The concept of “mare liberum” appeared to have been consigned to history. After an initial attempt to regulate the maximum permissible extent of the territorial sea in an international treaty failed in 1930, the four Geneva Conventions were finally adopted under United Nations auspices in 1958. The aim of these international agreements was to prevent the sea from being divided up, once and for all, between various countries. However, this aim was not achieved in full. For example, the discovery of major deep seabed deposits of manganese nodules in the eastern and central Pacific Ocean, at considerable distance from the coast, in the 1960s sparked new ambitions among the industrial countries (Chapter 7). At present, the key question being discussed is which nations can lay claim to the wealth of mineral resources located in the Arctic, which in future will become easier to access as the sea ice retreats.
More scope for coastal states
Today, UNCLOS draws together the four Geneva Conventions – the “old” law of the sea – in a single unified treaty. In substantive terms, however, it actually goes further than the four. For example, under the “new” law of the sea, the rights of the coastal states are expanded, in some cases substantially, in both qualitative and quantitative terms. For example, each coastal state has exclusive rights to exploit the fish stocks in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles out from the coastal baseline. Under the Geneva Conventions, the EEZ did not exist. UNCLOS also provides the legal basis for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which commenced its work in Hamburg in 1996. However, the Tribunal is not the only judicial institution responsible for safeguarding compliance with UNCLOS. The states parties to UNCLOS are free to choose whether they wish to submit disputes concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS to ITLOS, or whether they prefer to apply to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague or another international arbitral tribunal. It took some years for UNCLOS to be accepted: most industrialized countries rejected it at first due to a number of highly contentious provisions on deep sea mining. For example, UNCLOS initially required these nations to share their deep sea mining know-how with the developing countries. Once the provisions had been watered down, reinforcing the position of the industrial nations, UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, 12 months after Guyana became the 60th country to sign the Convention and 12 years after its adoption. As of July 2009, 157 states had acceded to the Convention. Countries which have not acceded to UNCLOS are still bound by the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conventions and the norms of customary international law
Clear rules, clear limits
The international law of the sea establishes a framework for conduct, especially in relation to economic interests, with which compliance is mandatory. It regulates fishing and navigation and the extraction of oil and gas at sea. Also the exploitation of other resources of the deep seabed and the protection of the marine environment are regulated. The law divides the seas into various legal zones. It defines the legal status and extent of these zones and establishes norms governing the rights and jurisdictions of the coastal and flag states in respect of these zones. A state’s jurisdiction decreases as the distance from the coast increases. Jurisdiction ranges from full territorial sovereignty (in internal waters) to limited “aquitorial” sovereignty (in the territorial sea) and limited jurisdiction (in the EEZ and continental shelf). The reference for the calculation of the various maritime zones is known as the baseline. The normal baseline is the mean low-water line along the coast as marked on charts officially recognized by the coastal state.
Waters on the landward side of the baseline belong to the state’s internal waters. They form part of the national territory of the coastal state, which has complete jurisdiction over them. In some cases, however, it is not the low-water line which delimits the internal waters; this applies in cases where straight baselines or closing lines across a bay are drawn. The law of the sea permits this approach if the coast is characterized by deep indentations and inlets (as in Norway), if a chain of islands stretches along and immediately adjacent to the coast (as with the North Frisian Islands) or if the coast has a bay. For example, the Wadden Sea, to the extent that it lies landwards of the outermost points of the North Frisian Islands, is just as much part of Germany’s internal waters as the ports of Kiel, Hamburg and Bremen. The territorial sea extends seawards of the baseline to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles. It is here that international law begins to restrict the sovereignty of the coastal state: ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. The coastal state may not make passage through the territorial sea subject to permission or similar restrictions. Under certain circumstances, however, it may take steps to channel ships in transit, e.g. by creating shipping lanes, in order to ensure the safety of navigation.
History/ Background of Law of The Sea.
Development of Law of The Sea.
Importance of Law of The Sea.
Law of The Sea
The earth is essentially a liquid planet, with more than 70% of its
surface covered by water. Although geographically divided and labeled as
continents, islands, seas, and oceans, the earth, when viewed from
outer space, appears as one large body of water interspersed with lesser
land masses. The world's oceans thus provide a common link for the more
than 110 nations whose shorelines are washed by their waters. Despite
these universal characteristics, however, this last earthly frontier had
become an arena for disputes over such matters as fishing rights and
varying claims of national jurisdiction, exploitation of deep sea
mineral resources, responsibility for the protection of the environment,
the right of innocent passage of ships, and free access to the sea for
landlocked countries.
The law of the sea is a body of
customs, treaties, and international agreements by which governments
maintain order, productivity, and peaceful relations on the sea.
Law
of the Sea is a body of international law that concerns the principles
and rules by which public entities, especially states, interact in
maritime matters, including navigational rights, sea mineral rights, and
coastal waters jurisdiction. It is the public law counterpart to
admiralty law, which concerns private maritime intercourse.
History of Law of The Sea
The
modern law of the sea dates to the beginning of the modern
international law. Grotius, the Dutch lawyer who is considered to be the
father of international law, is regarded as the father of the law of
the sea as well. His seminal work on the subject, the Free Seas, or Mare
Liberum, published in 1609, established some of the major concepts in
this field. He articulated the principle of the freedom of the seas,
that the sea should be free and open to use by all countries.
The
oceans had long been subject to the "freedom-of-the-seas" doctrine - a
principle put forth in the 17th century, essentially limiting national
rights and jurisdiction over the oceans to a narrow belt of sea
surrounding a nation's coastline. The remainder of the seas was
proclaimed to be free to all and belonging to none. While this situation
prevailed into the twentieth century, by the middle of it there was an
impetus to extend national claims over offshore.
The 1958 United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea attempted to formulate an
agreed legal definition of the continental shelf, and adopted the
following in article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf:
"For
the purpose of these articles, the term 'continental shelf' is used as
referring ... to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of
200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas; ..."
This definition contained the criteria of adjacency
to the coast and of "exploitability", which were soon questioned in view
of their imprecise and open-ended nature.
In the late 1960s, oil exploration was moving further and further from land, and deeper into the bedrock of continental margins.
The
oceans were being exploited as never before. Activities unknown barely
two decades earlier were in full swing around the world. Tin had been
mined in the shallow waters off Thailand and Indonesia. South Africa was
about to tap the Namibian coast for diamonds. Potato-shaped nodules,
found almost a century earlier and lying on the seabed some five
kilometres below were attracting increased interest because of their
metal content.
Meanwhile, large fishing vessels were now capable
of staying away from port for months at a time, permitting them to fish
anywhere, and at an unprecedented level, beginning to deplete important
fish stocks. Coastal States were setting limits and distant water
fishing States contesting them.
In the fall of 1967 technological
advances, conflicting uses, and superpower rivalry threatened the
oceans and even the seabed. The dangers were numerous: nuclear
submarines charting deep waters never before explored; designs for
antiballistic missile systems to be placed on the seabed; super tankers
ferrying oil from the Middle East to European and other ports, passing
through congested straits and leaving behind a trail of oil spills; and
rising tensions between nations over conflicting claims to ocean space
and resources.
On 1 November 1967, Malta's Ambassador to the
United Nations, Arvid Pardo, asked the nations of the world to consider
the impending conflict that could devastate the oceans, the lifeline of
man's very survival. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly,
he spoke of the superpower rivalry that was spreading to the oceans, of
the pollution that was poisoning the seas, of the conflicting legal
claims and their implications for a stable order, and of the rich seabed
resources.
Pardo ended with a call for "an effective
international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a
clearly defined national jurisdiction". "It is the only alternative by
which we can hope to avoid the escalating tension that will be
inevitable if the present situation is allowed to continue," he said.
Pardo's
speech set in motion a process that spanned 15 years and saw the
creation of the United Nations Seabed Committee, the signing of a treaty
banning nuclear weapons on the seabed, the adoption of the declaration
by the General Assembly that all resources of the seabed beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction are the common heritage of mankind and
the convening of the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment. What
started as an exercise to regulate the seabed turned into a global
diplomatic effort culminating in the convening of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to regulate and write rules for
all ocean areas, all uses of the seas and all of its resources - a
constitution for the oceans.
Long before it was adopted and the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was concluded, the
direction of the development of the new law of the sea was already
apparent. From the early seventies States in their national claims began
to act in anticipation of the outcome of the Conference. This trend
continued in the 1980's. The 1990's witnessed the consolidation of the
new order in the oceans.
The Convention was adopted as a "package
deal" to be accepted as a whole in all its parts without reservation on
any aspect. The influence that the convention has already exerted on
State practice is immense. There is in general a convergence towards the
Convention regime in all its aspects, even among many States which have
not yet ratified it. The Convention provides a predictable framework
for all the uses of the oceans and its resources and provides for
universally recognized limits for zones of national jurisdiction.
Development of Law of the Sea
Concern about the impact of new technologies upon the oceans, militarization and expanding state claims to ownership of parts of the oceans, e.g., continental shelf and exclusive economic zones, together with growing economic disparity and associated harm to long-term human security, prompted Arvid Pardo to develop the idea that all ocean space, i.e., surface of the sea, water column, seabed and its subsoil, and living resources, should be declared the CHM, irrespective of existing claims to national jurisdiction.
The intention was to replace the outdated legal concept of “freedom of the high seas” by proclaiming ocean areas an international commons. (Areas with significant natural resources that are acknowledged to be beyond the limits of the national jurisdiction of sovereign states are known as international commons.) Freedom of the high seas, developed by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), creates an open access regime allowing for its laissez-faire use. The few restrictions that exist serve only to protect the interests of other states and their exercise of free use.
In contrast, as the CHM, ocean space and its resources would be a commons that could not be owned by states beyond a certain limit. As a commons it would be open to the international community of states, but its use would be subject to international administration and management for the common good of all humanity. Where areas of ocean space and resources existed within national jurisdiction, states would regulate and manage use on behalf of all mankind, not solely for the benefit of national interests.
This approach recognized the unity of the oceans as ecological systems and rejected both laissez-faire freedom and unfettered state sovereignty. It included efforts to simplify ocean jurisdiction by establishing one single line of demarcation between national and international ocean space (Draft Ocean Space Treaty of 1971) and prevent gradually expanding claims to national jurisdiction.
The CHM was originally intended as a concept that would revolutionize the law of the sea by applying to all ocean space and resources. But in 1967 Arvid Pardo recognized that this would be rejected by the powerful states who were attempting to extend their sovereign claims to more ocean space and resources. By focusing on the legal status of the much more limited entity of the “seabed” beyond national jurisdiction, it was thought that CHM could gain an important foothold within the U.N. system.
The 1967 Maltese proposal lead to a number of important developments, including the 1970 U.N. General Assembly Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. This declaration set out the legal principles needed to implement the notion that the seabed and its resources are the CHM, and it helped create consensus for the negotiation of a new law of the sea convention: UNCLOS III (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea). The ultimate outcome was a much more limited application of CHM than ever intended by its advocates. As will be explained immediately below, UNCLOS III restricted the application of CHM to a few rocks, e.g., mineral resources such as manganese nodules, sitting on the bottom of the deep seabed.
Part XI of UNCLOS III deals with the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof (the “Area”) beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Article 136 declares the Area and its resources (only) to be the “common heritage of mankind.” The Area and its resources cannot be claimed, appropriated, or owned by any state or person (Article 137). All rights to resources belong to mankind as a whole, with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) acting on mankind’s behalf (Article 140). The ISA must ensure the equitable sharing of financial and other benefits arising from activities in the Area, taking into particular account the needs and interests of developing states and others. Promotion of research, transfer of technology to developing states and protection of the marine environment’s ecological balance are all important functions of the ISA (Articles 143–145).
Part XI provisions create an international administration and management regime for only a small part of the international commons (the Area and its resources). It does not generally replace the freedom of the high seas (Part VII); thus the intended revolution of the law of the sea was not achieved. In the 1970s, the most commercially viable mineral resources of the Area were thought to be manganese nodules, hence Pardo’s view that CHM was reduced in its application to “ugly little rocks lying in the darkest depths of all creation.” Despite this serious limitation, the use of CHM was revolutionary enough to be one of the reasons why the US refused to adhere to UNCLOS III.
To date, commercial use of the Area and its resources has not occurred. Further, the traditional fragmented approach to jurisdiction over separate elements of ocean space and resources endures despite the irrefutable unity of ecological systems.
Importance of Law of The Sea
One set of rules for all states
The international law of the sea comprises all the legal norms pertaining to the sea and applicable to relations between states. It contains rules on the delimitation and exploitation of maritime areas as well as provisions on the protection and exploration of the oceans. However, some fields fall outside its scope; these include matters covered by national legislation, such as regulations on port and harbour operations, and maritime law, which in Germany is mainly enshrined in the Commercial Code and regulates activities such as the transportation of goods.
The end of legal freedom
For thousands of years, the sea was simply a source of food and was only of interest to people to that extent. With the rise of the great seafaring nations such as the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain from the 15th century onwards, however, these kingdoms increasingly sought to expand their spheres of influence. Access to mineral resources and other new commodities aroused ambitions and triggered a race to conquer the oceans, faraway islands and coastlines and thus achieve dominance in the world. This led to numerous wars and sea battles. Early on, scholars sought answers to one important question: who does the sea actually belong to? It is a question which the international law of the sea has been unable to resolve satisfactorily to this day. From the outset, the quest for an answer was dominated by the tension between the concept of the freedom of the seas, or mare liberum (the free sea), formulated by the Dutch philosopher and jurist Hugo Grotius (1583 to 1645), and the concept of mare clausum (closed sea) developed by the English scholar and polymath John Selden (1584 to 1654). The pivotal issue was – and is – whether the sea is international territory and all nations are free to use it, or whether it can be claimed by individual states. Neither of these two positions has ultimately prevailed, and the conflict between the positions is still apparent in the present structure of the international law of the sea. Currently, the primary instrument of governance for the seas is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982 as the outcome of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). Various norms of customary international law supplement UNCLOS. The Convention is the most comprehensive international treaty ever concluded. It is based on the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted in 1958: these are the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. These treaties codified the – unwritten – custom- ary law which had previously applied. For example, since the mid-17th century, countries had generally accepted that national rights applied to a specified belt of water, known as the territorial sea, extending from a nation’s coastlines, usually for three nautical miles – roughly equivalent to the distance travelled by a cannon shot.
From the mid-20th century, the seas became an increasing focus of interest as a source of natural resources such as oil and gas. Many coastal states therefore attempted to extend their national jurisdiction over ever-larger areas of the sea and the seabed. Some laid claim to a 200 nautical mile zone. The concept of “mare liberum” appeared to have been consigned to history. After an initial attempt to regulate the maximum permissible extent of the territorial sea in an international treaty failed in 1930, the four Geneva Conventions were finally adopted under United Nations auspices in 1958. The aim of these international agreements was to prevent the sea from being divided up, once and for all, between various countries. However, this aim was not achieved in full. For example, the discovery of major deep seabed deposits of manganese nodules in the eastern and central Pacific Ocean, at considerable distance from the coast, in the 1960s sparked new ambitions among the industrial countries (Chapter 7). At present, the key question being discussed is which nations can lay claim to the wealth of mineral resources located in the Arctic, which in future will become easier to access as the sea ice retreats.
More scope for coastal states
Today, UNCLOS draws together the four Geneva Conventions – the “old” law of the sea – in a single unified treaty. In substantive terms, however, it actually goes further than the four. For example, under the “new” law of the sea, the rights of the coastal states are expanded, in some cases substantially, in both qualitative and quantitative terms. For example, each coastal state has exclusive rights to exploit the fish stocks in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles out from the coastal baseline. Under the Geneva Conventions, the EEZ did not exist. UNCLOS also provides the legal basis for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), which commenced its work in Hamburg in 1996. However, the Tribunal is not the only judicial institution responsible for safeguarding compliance with UNCLOS. The states parties to UNCLOS are free to choose whether they wish to submit disputes concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS to ITLOS, or whether they prefer to apply to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague or another international arbitral tribunal. It took some years for UNCLOS to be accepted: most industrialized countries rejected it at first due to a number of highly contentious provisions on deep sea mining. For example, UNCLOS initially required these nations to share their deep sea mining know-how with the developing countries. Once the provisions had been watered down, reinforcing the position of the industrial nations, UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, 12 months after Guyana became the 60th country to sign the Convention and 12 years after its adoption. As of July 2009, 157 states had acceded to the Convention. Countries which have not acceded to UNCLOS are still bound by the provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conventions and the norms of customary international law
Clear rules, clear limits
The international law of the sea establishes a framework for conduct, especially in relation to economic interests, with which compliance is mandatory. It regulates fishing and navigation and the extraction of oil and gas at sea. Also the exploitation of other resources of the deep seabed and the protection of the marine environment are regulated. The law divides the seas into various legal zones. It defines the legal status and extent of these zones and establishes norms governing the rights and jurisdictions of the coastal and flag states in respect of these zones. A state’s jurisdiction decreases as the distance from the coast increases. Jurisdiction ranges from full territorial sovereignty (in internal waters) to limited “aquitorial” sovereignty (in the territorial sea) and limited jurisdiction (in the EEZ and continental shelf). The reference for the calculation of the various maritime zones is known as the baseline. The normal baseline is the mean low-water line along the coast as marked on charts officially recognized by the coastal state.
Waters on the landward side of the baseline belong to the state’s internal waters. They form part of the national territory of the coastal state, which has complete jurisdiction over them. In some cases, however, it is not the low-water line which delimits the internal waters; this applies in cases where straight baselines or closing lines across a bay are drawn. The law of the sea permits this approach if the coast is characterized by deep indentations and inlets (as in Norway), if a chain of islands stretches along and immediately adjacent to the coast (as with the North Frisian Islands) or if the coast has a bay. For example, the Wadden Sea, to the extent that it lies landwards of the outermost points of the North Frisian Islands, is just as much part of Germany’s internal waters as the ports of Kiel, Hamburg and Bremen. The territorial sea extends seawards of the baseline to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles. It is here that international law begins to restrict the sovereignty of the coastal state: ships of all states enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. The coastal state may not make passage through the territorial sea subject to permission or similar restrictions. Under certain circumstances, however, it may take steps to channel ships in transit, e.g. by creating shipping lanes, in order to ensure the safety of navigation.
Complex
Adjacent to the territorial sea is the contiguous zone, which extends up to 24 nautical miles seawards from the baseline. In this area, which partly overlaps with the territorial sea, the coastal state may merely exercise rights of control. For example, it may verify compliance with or infringement of its national laws and regulations, including customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations, within its territorial sea. Further out to sea, there is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which stretches to 200 nautical miles seawards of the baseline. Unlike the internal waters and the territorial sea, the EEZ does not form part of the national territory. Here, the coastal state merely has specific limited rights which apply not to the maritime area itself but only to the resources existing within it. As the term “Exclusive Economic Zone” implies, only the coastal state may erect and utilize structures such as oil platforms and wind turbines here, or engage in fishing: third countries are excluded from such activities. This is highly significant from an economic perspective: for example, around 90 per cent of all commercially relevant fish species occur in the coastal states’ EEZs. This figure is even more striking given that these economic zones make up just 35 per cent of the seas’ total area.
Adjacent to the territorial sea is the contiguous zone, which extends up to 24 nautical miles seawards from the baseline. In this area, which partly overlaps with the territorial sea, the coastal state may merely exercise rights of control. For example, it may verify compliance with or infringement of its national laws and regulations, including customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations, within its territorial sea. Further out to sea, there is the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which stretches to 200 nautical miles seawards of the baseline. Unlike the internal waters and the territorial sea, the EEZ does not form part of the national territory. Here, the coastal state merely has specific limited rights which apply not to the maritime area itself but only to the resources existing within it. As the term “Exclusive Economic Zone” implies, only the coastal state may erect and utilize structures such as oil platforms and wind turbines here, or engage in fishing: third countries are excluded from such activities. This is highly significant from an economic perspective: for example, around 90 per cent of all commercially relevant fish species occur in the coastal states’ EEZs. This figure is even more striking given that these economic zones make up just 35 per cent of the seas’ total area.
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