General principles of Criminal Law on ICC

General principles of Criminal Law on ICC


General principles of Criminal Law on ICC



Nullum crimen sine lege

According to Article 22 of Rome Statute 

1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court. 

2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.  In  case  of  ambiguity,  the  definition  shall  be  interpreted  in  favour  of  the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 

3. This  article  shall  not  affect  the  characterization  of  any  conduct  as  criminal  under international law independently of this Statute.


Nulla poena sine lege

According to Article 23 of Rome Statute 

A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.


Non-retroactivity ratione personae

According to Article 24 of Rome Statute 

1. No  person  shall  be  criminally  responsible  under  this  Statute  for  conduct  prior  to the entry into force of the Statute. 

2. In  the  event  of  a  change  in  the  law  applicable  to  a  given  case  prior  to  a  final judgement, the law more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.


Individual criminal responsibility

According to Article 25 of Rome Statute

1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.

2. A  person  who  commits  a  crime  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  shall  be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.

3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liablevfor punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:

(a) Commits  such  a  crime,  whether  as  an  individual,  jointly  with  another  or through   another   person,   regardless   of   whether   that   other   person   is criminally responsible; 

(b) Orders,  solicits  or  induces  the  commission  of  such  a  crime  which  in  fact occurs or is attempted; 

(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or  otherwise  assists  in  its  commission  or  its  attempted  commission, including providing the means for its commission;

(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:

(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose  of  the  group,  where such  activity  or  purpose  involves  the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or

(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;

(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;

(f) Attempts  to  commit  such  a  crime  by  taking  action  that  commences  its execution  by  means  of  a  substantial  step,  but  the  crime  does  not  occur because   of   circumstances   independent   of   the   person's   intentions. However,  a  person  who  abandons  the  effort  to  commit  the  crime  or otherwise  prevents  the  completion  of  the  crime  shall  not  be  liable  for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.

4. No  provision  in  this  Statute  relating  to  individual  criminal  responsibility  shall affect the responsibility of States under international law.


Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under eighteen

According to Article 26 of Rome Statute

The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.


Irrelevance of official capacity

According to Article 27 of Rome Statute 

1. This  Statute  shall  apply  equally  to  all  persons  without  any  distinction  based  on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member   of   a  Government   or   parliament,   an   elected   representative   or   a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.


Responsibility of commanders and other superiors

According to Article 28 of Rome Statute

In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:

(a) A   military   commander   or   person   effectively   acting   as   a   military commander   shall   be   criminally   responsible   for   crimes   within   the jurisdiction  of  the  Court  committed  by  forces  under  his  or  her  effective command  and  control,  or  effective  authority  and  control  as  the  case  may be,  as  a  result  of  his  or  her  failure  to  exercise  control  properly  over  such forces, where:

(i) That  military  commander  or  person  either  knew  or,  owing  to  the circumstances  at  the  time,  should  have  known  that  the  forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and

(ii) That  military  commander  or  person  failed  to  take  all  necessary and  reasonable  measures  within  his  or  her  power  to  prevent  or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

(b) With  respect  to  superior  and  subordinate  relationships  not  described  in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  committed  by  subordinates  under  his  or  her effective  authority  and  control,  as  a  result  of  his  or  her  failure  to  exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:

(i) The  superior  either  knew,  or  consciously  disregarded  information which  clearly  indicated,  that  the  subordinates  were  committing  or about to commit such crimes;

(ii) The   crimes   concerned   activities   that   were   within   the   effective responsibility and control of the superior; and

(iii) The  superior  failed  to  take  all  necessary  and  reasonable  measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.


Non-applicability of statute of limitations

According to Article 29 of Rome Statute 

The  crimes  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  shall  not  be  subject  to  any  statute  of
limitations.


Mental element

According to Article 30 of Rome Statute 

1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment  for  a  crime  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  only  if  the  material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.

2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:

(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;

(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.

3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists  or  a  consequence  will  occur  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events.  ‘Know’  and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.


Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility

According to Article 31 of Rome Statute 

1. In  addition  to  other  grounds  for  excluding  criminal  responsibility  provided  for  in this  Statute,  a  person  shall  not  be  criminally  responsible  if,  at  the  time  of  that person's conduct:

(a) The  person  suffers  from  a  mental  disease  or  defect  that  destroys  that person's  capacity  to  appreciate  the  unlawfulness  or  nature  of  his  or  her conduct,  or  capacity  to  control  his  or  her  conduct  to  conform  to  the requirements of law;

(b) The person is in a state of intoxication that destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law, unless the  person  has  become  voluntarily  intoxicated  under  such  circumstances that  the  person  knew,  or  disregarded  the  risk,  that,  as  a  result  of  the intoxication, he or she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;

(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the   person   or   another   person   or   property   which   is   essential   for accomplishing  a  military  mission,  against  an  imminent  and  unlawful  use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the  other  person  or  property  protected.  The  fact  that  the  person  was involved  in  a  defensive  operation  conducted  by  forces  shall  not  in  itself constitute   a   ground   for   excluding   criminal   responsibility   under   this subparagraph;

(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death  or  of  continuing  or  imminent  serious  bodily  harm  against  that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to  avoid  this  threat,  provided  that  the  person  does  not  intend  to  cause  a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be:

(i) Made by other persons; or

(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's control.

2. The Court shall determine the applicability of the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute to the case before it.

3. At  trial,  the  Court  may  consider  a  ground  for  excluding  criminal  responsibility other than those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable   law   as   set   forth   in   article   21.   The   procedures   relating   to   the consideration of such a ground shall be provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.


Mistake of fact or mistake of law

According to Article 32 of Rome Statute

1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime.

2. A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it  negates  the  mental  element  required  by  such  a  crime,  or  as  provided  for  in article 33.


Superior orders and prescription of law

According to Article 33 of Rome Statute

1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:

(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question;

(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and

(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.

2. For  the  purposes  of  this  article,  orders  to  commit  genocide  or  crimes  against humanity are manifestly unlawful.

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